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THEMETHODOLOGY
AND THE DATA
THE MOST APPROPRIATE FRAME of reference for an analysis of the
ownership-related income of senior corporate executives is a com-
parison with the remuneration they receive in their capacity as em-
ployees. Accordingly, a brief summary of the procedures utilized in
arriving at the findings of the initial compensation study seems in
order. It will also serve as an introduction to the methodology of the
current investigation, since the same procedures have been extended
to the two additional samples examined here. The techniques adopted
in generating measures of annual ownership income, and in relating
the various earnings flows to each other, will be seen to follow di-
rectly from the original analytical framework.
The Compensation Figures
As indicated earlier, the motive for undertaking the compensation
study was to improve upon the prevailing empirical treatment of
executive pay, which implicitly assumed that salary and bonus pay-
ments alone, provided an adequate index of remuneration for purposes
of drawing conclusions about inter-company or inter-industry patterns
of reward. The rapid growth in popularity of several key forms of
deferred and contingent compensation during the years immediately
following World War II suggested, however, that a more comprehen-
sive approach might well be required if developments in corporate
policy were to be appraised properly. With that in mind, the objective
established was to develop and apply a set of techniques which would
permit measurement of the remuneration furnished by all the major
items in the managerial pay package. The intention was that this be14 THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT
accomplished in a manner that would not only allow the resulting
values to be compared meaningfully but would produce a workable
figure for total annual compensation.
The magnitude of the income accruing to an individual in a given
year from his salary and bonus earnings was easily determined, simply
by subtracting from the observed pre-tax amounts the relevant statu-
tory personal income tax liability for the year. The latter must reflect
the deductions and exemptions from taxable income which the man
is likely to claim, but estimates of those quantities, by income bracket,
were obtainable from IRS Statistics of Income tabulations.
A more imaginative approach was necessary in connection with
rewards which had more complex timing, taxation, and contingency
features. For each such "noncurrent" instrument, the valuation frame-
work consisted of specifying what was denoted its "current income
equivalent." This concept was defined to be the amount of additional
current income—additional salary and bonus, if you will—which
would be as valuable, after taxes, to the executive in question as the
particular arrangement being considered. In effect, the hypothesis
was that the most useful way to go about measuring on a common
scale the compensation provided by the disparate supplements to
direct cash payments to executives was to calculate the size of the
cash increments which, if substituted for those supplements, would
leave the men involved equally well off. "Equally well off" was, of
course, perceived in after-tax terms.
As an illustration, in the case of a pension plan the question was
asked: How much of an increase in annual after-tax salary would
the prospective pension recipient require in order to be able to pur-
chase therewith an individual retirement annuity from an insurance
company which would be similar in form and equal in value to the
benefits promised him under his corporation's retirement plan? The
indicated annual premium payments to the insurer were taken to be
the "after-tax current income equivalent" of the man's pension ex-
pectations. They measure very precisely the amount of additional
immediate cash income he would need in order to meet the purchase
price of an alternative market instrument guaranteeing him the same
level of economic security in retirement that his pension was designedTHE METHODOLOGY AND THE DATA 15
to provide. By extension, the increase in his annual pre-tax salary
which would have produced the required after-tax increments was
interpreted as the pension's "before-tax current income equivalent."
While pension promises were especially easy to handle in such a
framework due to the existence of a close market substitute readily
available to an individual executive, other supplementary compensa-
tion arrangements were amenable to valuation by essentially the
same approach. The current income equivalent of a post-retirement
deferred pay contract, for example, was defined as that stream of
annual payments which, if begun in the year the contract was entered
into and continued up to retirement age, would have an after-tax
present value matching that of the prospective deferred payments
themselves. The equivalent of a stock option was specified to be a
series of cash increments spread over the formal term of the option
and having a value equal to the difference—net of capital gains
taxes—between the option price of the shares involved and their
market price on the date the option was exercised by its recipient.
Similar procedures were employed in valuing the other components of
the pay package. The result is a set of indices of remuneration which
permit convenient and accurate statements about the absolute mag-
nitude and relative importance of a group of originally quite different
rewards.
The details of those procedures are sufficiently extensive that the
interested reader is referred to the original treatise for their complete
description.' An illustration of the kind of profile of the managerial
pay package which emerges from their application to a typical indi-
vidual's experience will be provided below. For present purposes,
however, it should be enough to stress that in designing the relevant
valuation techniques,the followingprincipleswere adheredto
throughout:(1) "Equivalence" between a series of hypothetical
increments to current income on the one hand, and the benefits
anticipated from a given deferred or contingent compensation arrange-
ment on the other, was always defined in terms of the after-tax present
values of the two streams of payments. (2) The current income
equivalent amounts were established according to that approach by
'Lewellen, op. cit., see especially Chapters 2 through 6.16 THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT
specifying that they be spread over the period of the executive's working
life, during which he was earning the right to receive the applicable
deferred payments.2 (3) Secular increases in benefits pursuant to a
particular compensation plan were taken into account by constructing
an additional current income equivalent "layer"for each such
increase. (4) Every current equivalent thereby created was designed
in a manner that would allow it to become an operational alternative
to the arrangement being evaluated in an actual scheme of executive
rewards.Corporations could,inpractice,literallyreplacetheir
officers' pensions, deferred pay, or stock options with the respective
current income equivalents and generate precisely matching levels of
annual after-tax remuneration. If these principles are kept in mind,
the bulk of what is important about the character of the compensa-
tion figures which serve as background to the ownership income
analysis here can be understood.3
Parameters of the Study
As part of the computational process, a number of assumptions about
the personal economic circumstances of the men included in the
sample were necessary. As noted above, estimates of deductions and
exemptions from currently taxable earnings were taken from Statistics
of Income records covering the appropriate period,4 the convention
being that senior corporate executives' experiences follow the aver-
ages for their various income brackets each year. In the absence of
any definite evidence to the contrary, it was further assumed that
the individuals involved were married and, therefore, that the income-
splitting feature of the federal personal tax applied. Where possible,
this assumption was checked by consulting one of the available
Who's Who compilations.5
2 Thus, the elements in the current income equivalent of a pension promise
were spread over the interval beginning with the time the executive first came
under the plan and ending with age sixty-four.
For a description of some alternative methodology, directed generally
toward the same objective, see Burgess, op. cit.
U.S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of income:
individual Tax Returns, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office.
E.g., Who's Who in America and World Who's Who in Commerce and
Industry, both published in Chicago by Marquis—Who's Who, Incorporated.THE METHODOLOGY AND THE DATA 17
Since it seemed probable that most highly paid executives would
enjoy at least some additional income from sources other than their
employer companies, external receipts amounting to 15 per cent of
the observed annual salary and bonus payments were specified in
every instance. The feeling was that this might represent something
like a 4 to 5 per cent annual pre-tax return in the form of dividend
and interest income on an investment portfolio three to four times
the man's yearly cash compensation. The point of recognizing these
flows was to arrive at a set of marginal tax rate calculations reflecting
the fact that executives almost certainly received their remuneration
as employees in concert with other receipts; accordingly, correspond-
ingly higher effective marginal brackets than compensation payments
alone would suggest should be prescribed, given a progressive rate
structure. In that context, of course, any capital gains realized can
be ignored, since the alternative flat 25 per cent tax rate thereon
would have been chosen by men at the income levels empirically
relevant here. As it happens, theresultingpredictions of taxable
"outside income" appear to have been somewhat on the low side in
the light of subsequent information. We shall return to. this issue
below.
In computing the various present values required in the analysis, a
2 1/2percent per annum after-tax discount rate was utilized when
dealing with secure benefit promises of the type associated with
pension and cash deferred compensation arrangements. A 5percent
per annum after-tax rate was used for the more uncertain stock
options, stock deferred pay, and other stock-based schemes. These
parameters were picked to approximate the kinds of returns that
might have been expected from, on the one hand, a pure bond port-
folio and, on the other, a diversified equities fund, during the period
1940 to 1963 for which data were collected.6 While these are obvi-
ously arbitrary choices open to a range of possible criticisms, the
figures decided upon do not seem unreasonable and any alternative
assumptions could be similarly attacked.
6Theidea was to specify opportunity costs which would be characteristic of
the returns promised by investment vehicles embodying degrees of risk com-
parable to the rewards in question. It will be noted that the time period exam-
ined precedes the severe credit pressures and rising interest rates of the mid—
1960's.18 THE OWNERSHiP iNCOME OF MANAGEMENT
Nevertheless, to avoid being too cavalier, in the case of these
percentages and each of the other parameters indicated, a thorough
sensitivity analysis was performed to test the likelihood that the com-
pensation figures generated might depend significantly on the particular
parametric values incorporated in the computations. The clear conclu-
sion was that any meaningful set of substitute choices—e.g., doubling
the two discount rates to 5 and 10 per cent per annum after taxes.—
would have had little impact on either the historical trends or cross-
sectional patterns which emerged. The saving feature of the situation
turned out to be the fact that most assumptions influenced both sides
of the many compensation-benefitsvs.current-income-equivalent
equations to just about the same extent, thus creating offsetting effects
on the earnings measures produced.7
Coverage
Given the framework described, the only noteworthy items of remu-
neration that had to be excluded from the empirical analysis for lack
of sufficient information were life and medical insurance programs
and executive expense accounts. CorpOrate proxy statements do not
list the benefit structures or receipts enjoyed by individual officers
under either category of reward. Fortunately, for executives at the
level we will be concerned with here, such devices should not bulk
large in the compensation totals nor should their absence compromise
the usefulness of the findings.8 With these minor exceptions, it was
For example, if a 5 per cent discount rate were used in calculating the
present value of an executive's pension expectations instead of aper cent
figure, the same 5 per cent rate should be adopted in finding the individual
retirement annuity whose purchase would provide a matching present value.
Since it necessarily is the comparison between the resulting present value figures
rather than their respective absolute magnitudes which establishes "equivalence"
in this manner, a fairly wide range of discount rates wilE, if applied simultane-
ously to both sides, yield roughly the same answers. See Lewellen, op. cit.,
Chapter 12, for the details.
SSupportfor this contention in connection with expense accounts can be
found in C. A. Hall, Jr., Effects of Taxation on Executive Compensation and
Retirement Plans, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Riverside Press, 1951, where he
states on p. 14 that: "According to executives interviewed, company-paid-for
expenses of the type which really reduce executives' buying costs and repre-THE METHODOLOGY AND THE DATA 19
possible for the large manufacturing companies—and is possible for
the retailing and small mantifacturing firms—to develop a good
chronological record of the size and composition of the senior cor-
porate executive pay package dating back to the year 1940. Since
the SEC and its proxy statement reporting requirements are both
relatively recent phenomena, consistently reliable and comprehensive
information for earlier periods is simply not available.
Application
A concrete illustration of the kind of output which is generated when
the computational procedures outlined are applied to a particular
executive's employment circumstances is provided in Appendix A. As
can be seen from that illustration, the analytical framework adopted
requires a very "personalized" approach to valuation. In order to
appraise an executive's rewards, his age and marital status must be
known, and data on his compensation must be processed, from the
moment he first becomes eligible for benefits under any of his firm's
important deferred or contingent pay plans. It is these requirements
which dictate that only the rewards of those men whose earnings his-
tories are reported on in corporate proxy statements can be analyzed;
such documents are the sole public repositories of information on the
pay of particular individuals. This explains why the here will
be exclusively with the topmost segment of the managerial hierarchy.
Stock Ownership Data
Those same executives' stockholdings in their own companies com-
prise the other—and at the moment, more important—portion of the
story. As was indicated above, the possibility that the income conse-
quences of senior corporate officers' equity investments in their
employer firms might be quite substantial was raised by a casual
inspection of stock ownership positions while the initial data on corn-
sent extra income are of negligible importance in large companies." Admittedly,
the age of this finding may by now cast some doubt on its credibility, but no
more recent evidence seems to be available.20 THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT
pensation were being collected. Upon completion of that effort, a more
careful appraisal of the dimensions and implications of the Owner-
ship phenomenon—as well as an extension of the entire analysis to a
broader range of enterprises—seemed a logical next step.
The approach was simply to go through the appropriate proxy
statements and record, for each man whose circumstances were of
interest, the number of shares of his company's common stock that
he owned at the beginning of every year for which compensation data
had been compiled.9 The published figures pertain to those securities
which are either directly or beneficially owned by the executive and
his immediate family. An example of beneficial ownership, as inter-
preted by the SEC, would be a situation in which shares are tempo-
rarily held in trust for the man in question under an arrangement
calling for his receipt of the annual dividends thereon and for the
subsequent distribution of the shares to him upon, say, the demise
of a relative. Alternatively, the securities might be nominally owned
by a private holding company, which in turn would be controlled by
the man and his family. In either case, the pecuniary rewards and
contingencies of a direct ownership position are effectively transmitted
to the individual executive, and the shares at issue properly considered
a part of his total portfolio. However, the vast majority of stock-
holdings observed empirically were owned outright by the men in the
sample.
On the other side of the coin, the "immediate family" definition
noted encompasses only the executive, his wife, and their unmarried
children. The likelihood, therefore, is that the resulting data somewhat
understate the true intensity of management's ownership involvement.
Securities held by married children and by other fairly close family
members are excluded—and these could, of course, be sizeable on
occasion. The omissions are worth pointing out. They imply that a
more comprehensive set of figures, were it available, would necessarily
identify additional holdings whose influence would reinforce many of
the conclusions offered here.
Employer-company preferred stock and/or bond holdings by executives
were not included in the investigation, both because they were of negligible
size in the aggregate, and because, in principle,itisthe identification of
executives with commonstockholder interestswhich isat issue here.THE METHODOLOGY AND THE DATA 21
Since most senior corporate executives are also members of their
respective firms' boards of directors, the proxy 'statement information
on directors' stock ownership makes it possible to obtain data for all
but a very few men whose compensation places them among their
companies' top employees. In situations where the proxy statement
listings are inadequate, a secondary source of information is the
monthly SEC publication Official Summary of Security Transactions
and Holdings.1° This document contains a record of the securities
owned—again, either directly or beneficially—by corporate officers
and directors who buy or sell any of their firms' common or preferred
shares within a given thirty-day period. While the data frequently
lag behind the actual transactions by several months, for purposes
of an historical analysis an executive can often be located among
those tabulations for the years during which he was an officer but not
yet a director.1' In all, reliable annual stock ownership figures could
be compiled for fully 552 of the 558 men who comprised the original
large-manufacturing compensation sample, and for every one of the
nearly 400 additional highly paid executives in the small-manufactur-
ing and retail trade samples. The characteristics of each of these
three groups will be discussed below.
Computational Framework
When the resulting stockholding data are supplemented by records
of past share prices and corporate dividend declarations, a variety of
elements of senior management's secular ownership experience may
be examined. By the nature of our objectives, the market value of the
indicated holdings at particular points in time, the capital gains and
losses to which the individuals involved were subjected, and the cash
dividends they received would appear to be the most significant com-
ponents of that experience.
Since corporations report the relevant stock ownership positions
every year, it is both a logical undertaking and an easy task to con-
10 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C., Govern-
ment Printing Office.
11 The same tabulations also assisted in identifying the dates of stock option
exercises by executives as part of the compensation investigation.22 THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT
struct an annual record of the market value of top executives' equity
investments in their own firms. The first of the year seems a con-
venient valuation date, and the figures generated in subsequent chap-
ters therefore are produced by multiplying the number of shares of
his company's common stock owned by the executive as of January
1of each year by the corresponding January 1 market price per
share.12 Because certain firms list directors' stockholdings for other
dates, the Official Summary of Transactions bulletin cited above was
used, where necessary, to retrace the relevant data to the start of the
year.
The annual capital gains and losses associated with the observed
holdings can, of course, take two forms: realized gains and so-called
"paper" gains. The combined consequences of both should, in the
view here, be recognized as important to a determination of the total
effective ownership income of top executives—since quite clearly
both can contribute to substantial changes in an individual's personal
net worth. This contention is reinforced by the opportunity which is
always available for investors to realize indirectly whatever paper
gains they may enjoy by pledging the securities whose value has
appreciated as collateral for personal loans. Accordingly, an execu-
tive's aggregate capital gain or loss as recorded for a particular year
is computed by adding to his realized profits or losses from sales of
his corporation's common stock during that year the increase or
decrease in the market value from January 1 to December 31 of any
shares he held throughout the year.
In order to properly implement this accrual approach to valuation
and measurement, it was necessary in each instance to define the
appropriate annual magnitudes in such a way as to avoid double-
counting. This was accomplished by treating as the relevant realized
gain for the year in question only the difference between the selling
price of the shares disposed of and their immediately preceding Janu-
ary 1 market price. Thus, a significant fraction of many of the realized
gains experienced by the men in the sample end up being parceled out
12Actually,due to the New Year holiday, December 31 closing prices were
employed instead. The data were collected from back issues of the Wall
Street Journal and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle.THE METHODOLOGY AND THE DATA 23
here as accrued gains attributable to prior periods. By the same token,
the paper gain tabulated for stock which is observed to be acquired
after the beginning of a given year but held at least until the start of
the following year is set equal to the difference between the purchase
price of the shares and their market price on the succeeding Decem-
ber 31. These procedures provide both a consistent and comprehen-
sive annual record of the capital appreciation patterns at issue.13
As a means of keeping the data collection and programming effort
required within manageable bounds, however, an approximation to
these procedures was decided upon in the execution of the analysis,
especially where share prices were concerned. To avoid having to take
into account individually all of the various stock transactions engaged
in by the some 950 men in the three samples over the quarter-century
period studied, the assumption was made instead that all purchases
and sales took place at a price midway between the opening and
closing prices of the year in which the transaction occurred.
For example, if an executive were found to own five-thousand
shares of his firm's stock on January 1, 1960, their market value then
being $20 per share, and six-thousand shares on December 31 at a
price of $30 each, he was assumed to have acquired the observed
difference of one-thousand shares at a cost of $25 per share during
the year. His total capital gain was therefore defined to be $55,000—
the imputed result of a $10 per share increment on five-thousand
shares, plus a $5 gain on one-thousand shares. Without this simpli-
fication, the data needs for the study would have quickly gotten out
of hand because of the sheer number of man-years of experience
involved, despite the fact that the great majority of senior executives
really undertake very little short-term trading in their employer com-
Toillustrate: Consider the case of an executive who purchases 1000
shares of his company's common stock during 1960 and resells them in
1962. Let us assume that the purchase price was $50 per share; the Decem-
ber 31, 1960, price $60 per share; the December 31, 1961, price $70; and
the eventualselling price $80. Pursuant to the computational framework
adopted here, the over-all realized profit of $30,000 before taxes would be
divided up as an accrued capital gain of $10,000 for the year 1960, an
accrued gain of $10,000 for 1961. and a realized gain of $10,000 for 1962.
The corresponding measurements for any shares both bought and sold within
a single year, of course, are clear-cut.24 THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT
panies' shares.'4 There is no reason to suspect that, in the aggregate,
any bias is thereby introduced into the findings or that any important
information is lost.'5 The necessary share price adjustments for stock
splits and stock dividends are, of course, built into the computations.
Executives' cash dividend receipts are estimated in a similar man-
ner. If a man's stockholdings are seen to change during a particular
year, the convention is that he received just half the total reported
cash dividend payments by the firm for that year on the incremental
shares. In the example cited above, then, if the corporation's 1960
dividend rate had been $1 per share, the executive described would
have been credited with a total pre-tax dividend income of $5500,
this consisting of $1 each on five-thousand, shares added to 50 cents
per share on one-thousand shares. In cases where stock dividends are
declared, a complementary approximation is employed. The assump.-
tion is that the additional shares are distributed to the man halfway
through the relevant year, causing his cash dividend receipts to be
higher to that extent over the second six months. By this procedure,
a 4 per cent stock dividend is translated into aggregate cash dividend
flows amounting to 102 per cent of the reported per-share figure for
the year.
Compensation and Ownership Income
It should be stressed that in all the foregoing calculations, a careful
separation is maintained between the compensation which is generated
in particular periods for the executive by such arrangements as stock
bonuses and stock options on the one hand, and the man's subsequent
investment income from his continued ownership of the shares thus
acquired on the other. Once those shares are formally conveyed to
him by his firm under a stock bonus plan, for instance, the compensa-
14Fordocumentation, see below, pp. 107—108.
15Thus,it would seem that possible errors in the attendant stock price
estimates are as apt to be on the high as the low side of the true values in
any given situation. They may, in consequence, be expected to balance out
for the sample as a whole. Indirect support for this contention can be found
in C. E. Edwards and J. G. Hilton, "A Note on the High-Low Price Average
as an Estimator of Annual Average Stock Prices," Journal of Finance, Vol.
XXI, No. 1 (March 1966), pp. 112—115.THE METHODOLOGY AND THE DATA 25
tion aspect of the interchange is regarded here as finished. Similarly,
the option agreement—and the process of measuring the magnitude
of the attendant remuneration—is treated as being terminated on the
date the option recipient exercises his right to purchase the specified
securities. The difference between the market price of the securities at
that point and the stated option price the man pays definitively estab-
lishes his reward.16 Any dividend earnings or capital gains experienced
thereafter from any of these holdings clearly occur as a result of the
executive's decision to retain the securities in his portfolio and to
pursue the associated investment in his company. Because those
flows are not logically a part of the compensation transaction, they
are grouped here with the ownership income attributable to other
stockholdings. This distinction is worth bearing in mind in interpreting
the subsequent findings.
Tax Liabilities
On the presumption that the capital gains realized by senior corporate
executives from trading in their own firms' common shares are pre-
dominantly long-term in nature,17 a reasonable first approximation
of the applicable tax liabilities thereon would be aflat 25per cent.
In almost every case, such men have incomes large enough to lead
them, when the issue arises, to choose this "alternative" tax computa-
tion in preference to including half their capital gains with inflows
taxable at regular statutory rates.18 In the present context, however,
it is necessary to specify the implicit tax liabilities on accrued as well
as on actually realized gains if the hoped-for annual record of execu-
tives' ownership income is to be made meaningful in after-tax terms
for purposes of a comparison with compensation. Because the pay-
ment of such taxes is, of course, deferred to the date the securities in
16 The mechanics of translating that figure into a "current income equivalent"
for the option are described in Lewellen, op. cit., Chapter 4.
17 Again, see pp. 107—108 below.
18 For example, during the period 1954 to 1963 which comprised the last
ten years of the empirical analysis, 25percent was the pertinent capital gains
tax rate for any individual whose taxable income exceeded $32,000. Very few
executives in the sample fell below that level.26 THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT
question are sold rather than being levied on the accrual basis used
here to measure many of the pre-tax gains which are of interest, some
adjustment for the consequences of deferral is required. In addition,
there is always the possibility that a portion of the relevant gains will
turn out to be so long-term as to escape income taxation entirely—
i.e., the securities may be retained in the executive's portfolio until
he dies, in which circumstance no capital gains tax on the accrued
profits would be paid.
For these reasons, 15 per cent was adopted as an estimate of the
"true" over-all effective rate and was applied uniformly in the calcu-
lations to both realized and accrued annual before-tax capital gains.
The choice was arbitrary, and Was designed merely to remove in a
convenient manner at least some part of what would otherwise
ously have been a persistent bias toward attributing too high a tax
liability to the observed gains had the nominal 25percent figure
been used. The reader is asked to interpret the choice in that spirit.'9
As it happens, just about any figure between zero and 25 per cent
could be employed as far as the conclusions reached in the following
chapters are concerned, since the important comparisons, as we
shall see, are quite insensitive to the particular tax rate chosen in the
19 As a rough guide, the feeling was that 15 per cent would be a reasOnable
approximation of the resulting average tax rate if one-fifth of the executives
in the sample passed on their stockholdings in their estates—thereby reducing
the ave.rage rate from 25 to 20 per cent—and, further, if in the face of an
after-tax annual discount rate of 5 per cent, the mean length of time for the
remaining individuals between the accrual and the realization of their capital
gains were five years. Hence, the discount factor will diminish •the
effective present value of a tax liability on a gain accrued currently by about
one-fouEth, and lower an implied 20 per cent tax rate to 15 per cent. While
basing the decision on these supplementary makes the final result
no less arbitrary, it does suggest the factors which were considered. Subsequent
to the time the computations for the current investigation were performed, a
study by Bailey (M. J. Bailey, "Capital Gains and Income Taxation," in A.
C.Harberger and J.Bailey,eds.,The Taxationo/ Income From
Capital, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1969, pp. 11—49) pre-
sented evidence suggesting that a number as low as 8 or 9 per cent would be
a reasonable approximation of the actual effective tax rate on capital gains
for the average investor. By that standard, the after-tax capital gains attributed
hereto executives—and, inconsequence,thestrength of the
management income link—will tend to have been understated. Once again,
therefore, the revision in the data which would be called for would only
buttress the arguments made below.THE METHODOLOGY AND THE DATA 27
indicated range. For consistency, 15 per cent was also designated as
the effective tax rate on stock option profits in the compensation
calculations. In both applications,capital gains and losses were
treated symmetrically by imputing an associated 15 per cent tax
saving to any declines in the market value of securities held, on the
assumption that sufficient ultimate net profits would exist to provide
a usable tax offset, should paper losses eventually emerge as realized
losses.
The levies on executives' dividend receipts from holdings of their
firms' shares present a slightly different problem. Given a progressive
personal income tax schedule, the taxes assessed on such receipts,
those on concurrent salary and bonus payments, and those on what-
ever additional income executives may enjoy from other sources, are
interdependent. To ensure accuracy, the magnitude of each element
for the relevant year for every individual should be specified prior to
calculating the taxes on any one of the three. The difficulty is that
in arriving at tax liabilities in connection with the original compen-
sation study of large manufacturers, an estimate of the probable size
of executives' total taxable noncompensation income (which would
include inflows from investments in both their own and other com-
panies' stock) had to be made.2° As the dividend data, or at least that
portion relating to ownership of employer-company shares, now
become directly available, however, the initial outside income esti-
mate of 15 per cent of a man's pre-tax annual salary plus bonus earn-
ings begins to apear too low. Indeed, employer-company dividend pay-
ments to executives turn out to be sufficiently large in themselves as
to suggest that a figure for total noncompensation income of approxi-
mately 30 per cent of the observed salary plus bonus payments would
have been a better estimate to begin with.21
In the light of that evidence, the implication is that the compensa-
tion analysis should be repeated with an improved choice of param-
eters, and a new set of time series generated for the current investiga-
tion. Not surprisingly, that solution will be rejected here—but for
reasons of principle as well as concern with the practical problem of
20See above, pp. 16—17.
Thedata are presented in Chapter 4.28 THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT
actually redoing the extensive calculations required. For one thing,
the fact is that even if an underestimate of top management's aggre-
gate taxable outside income has been made, the gain in accuracy
which would be achieved by revising the estimate would be very
small. Sensitivity tests with alternative assumptions about outside
income ranging from zero to 50 per cent of salary plus bonus were
undertaken as part of the original compensation study.22 The clear
conclusion was that the resulting historical profile of the components
of the pay package for the typical executive would not have been
significanfly affected even by substantial changes in those assump-
tions.23
Secondly, a finding to the effect that executives' pre-tax dividend
and interest income amounted on average to, say, 30 per cent as much
as their pre-tax salary and bonus earnings would by no means imply
that their total additional taxable income was of that magnitude. Just
as the normal disposition of income received in the form of employee
compensation gives rise to deductions for tax purposes, it is equally
likely that the expenses associated with the maintenance of a large
investment portfolio would cause the taxable income generated there-
from to be noticeably less than the corresponding gross income. In
particular, it does not seem unreasonable to expect that fairly sizeable
deductions for interest payments might frequently be claimed by
executives as a consequence of having borrowed the funds to acquire
some fraction of the equity portfolios we observe.24 By that inter-
pretation, the initial stipulation that effective tax rates on senior
corporate officers' direct annual income could be calculated by assum-
ing aggregate receipts equal to 115 per cent of recorded salary plus
bonus payments does not, in retrospect, seem an inappropriate basis
for the analysis. The tax liabilities on compensation prescribed by
this assumption will, therefore, be retained here, and the relevant
22 See the earlier discussion on p. 18.
23 Lewellen, op. cit., Chapter 12.
24 The prevalence of this phenomenon was suggested to the author in con-
versations with V. Henry RothschildII,whose book Compensating the
Corporate Executive (New York, Ronald Press, Editions in 1942, 1951, and
1962), written in collaboration with G. T. Washington, is the classic work in
the field of executive remuneration.THE METHODOLOGY AND THE DATA 29
liabilities on the dividend income from holdings of employer-company
shares. will be determined simply by applying matching over-all
effective tax rates to those payments as well.
To illustrate: An executive who was paid $100,000 in salary and
bonus by his firm during a given year was specified, in the frame-
work of the compensation investigation, to have enjoyed an additional
$15,000 worth of current ordinary income from other sources. Let
us suppose that, after the probable amounts of his deductions and
exemptions were taken into consideration—by utilizing IRS data
on income recipients in the $1 15,000 range for the year in question—
the man's total personal tax liability was estimated to be $46,000. Of
that aggregate figure, the fraction 100/115, or $40,000, would have
been attributed to his salary and bonus payments, implying a 40
per cent over-all effective tax rate and an after-tax direct cash com-
pensation of $60,000.
Accordingly, taxes at 40 per cent will be assumed here to apply
to any dividend receipts enjoyed by the executive from ownership
of his firm's shares—even if they turn out to exceed $15,000 before
taxes for the relevant year. The same procedure will be followed for
all three company samples examined, the compensation calculations
in each case preceding the introduction of the attendant stock own-
ership data.
To the extent that the average executive's taxable income is there-
by underestimated, the effect of these approximations will be an
overstatement of after-tax and after-tax dividend
receipts, owing to an understatement of the pertinent tax liabilities.25
This will, however, bias the findings in such a way as to make the
relative importance of top management's ownership income depend-
25Somefeeling for the degree of possible tax understatement which might
be involved in a typical situation can be obtained from the example cited
above. According to the federal personal income tax schedule that was in
force from 1954 through 1963, the over-all effective tax rate on a gross income
of $115,000 would have been 45.3 per cent, assuming deductions and exemp-
tions at the general level indicated by IRS tabulations. The effective rate on
might consist of $100,000 of salary and bonus plus an
additional 30 per cent rather than 15 per cent outside income—would have
been 47.4 per cent. That difference does not seem a cause for concern, even
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ence appear less than it really is, since salaries and bonuses happen
to comprise a larger share of total compensation than dividends
comprise of total ownership income. If errors have been made by
overoptimism about the magnitude of executives' deductions and
exemptions from taxable income, then, the appropriate corrections
would only strengthen the conclusions reached below. This issue will
be addressed more precisely through sensitivity analyses as the data
are developed.26
Net and Absolute Capital Gains
In connection with certain of the important comparisons, separate
calculations will be presented for what are termed the "net" and
"absolute" capital gains experienced by executives. The objective
in so doing will be to go beyond the combined effects of annual
corporate stock price changes on the wealth position of the entire
group of men in the sample in order to highlight the individual profits
and losses—whether realized or accrued—which comprise those
aggregate figures. Thus, ifit should occur that in a sample of 50
senior executives during a particular period, 25 enjoyed increases in
the market value of their employer-company shareholdings amounting
to $50,000 apiece, and the other 25 each suffered simultaneous
$50,000 declines, it would follow that, on balance, no net capital
gain was experienced by the group as a whole. On the other hand,
it is also true that the mean absolute change in wealth for the 50
executives was fully $50,000 per capita. The choice as to which of
these two measures of ownership income flows is the more relevant
in a given situation is a function of the nature of the problem being
examined. Still,it seems desirable that both be available for the
researcher's—andthereader's—alternativeinterpretation.Con-
veniently enough, the stock prices of the various individual firms
which were included in the three samples moved in similar directions
with sufficient frequency that in most years the differences—except
for sign—between the average net and absolute gains figures were
slight.
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The Large Manufacturing Sample
The group of corporations to whose executives' circumstances the
foregoing analytical framework will be applied consists of 80 firms
broken down into three distinct categories. As has been indicated,
50 of these firms are classed among the very largest of the nation's
manufacturing and represent the sample which was
compiled for the original study of executive compensation. They
were chosen by a process which was designed to include literally the
50 largest such companies. However, problems with gaps in the
necessary data, with mergers, and with the late stock exchange list-
ings of certain firms prevented this goal from being achieved.
The basic reference source was Fortune magazine's roster of the
five hundred largest industrials.28 While corporations in that tabula-
tion are ranked according to their sales volumes for the year, similar
rankings by total assets, by profits, or by aggregate stock market
values would result in essentially the same firms appearing on the
corresponding lists.20 The selection technique was simply to begin
at the top and work down, including in the sample every company
for whom sufficient information was available in past proxy state-
ments to permit a meaningful historical analysis and evaluation of
itstop executives' remuneration. The description above, and in
Appendix A, of the computational procedures employed suggests that
the associated data requirements were reasonably stringent. As a
consequence, the manner in which many firms chose to respond to the
SEC's reporting rules for compensation made it impossible to include
them in the investigation.
Similarly, because other companies of substantial size in 1963 had
27 The combined sales of the 50 firms in 1963 were $93.8 billion, and total
manufacturing sector revenues inthat year were $417.3billion.Source:
United States Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, May
1965, p. S-4.
28 "The Fortune Directory," Fortune, Vol. 70, No. 1 (July 1964), pp. 179—
198.
29 For example, when the corporations on the Fortune list were re-ranked
on the basis of their total assets, only four of the initial top twenty in 1963
were not present among the top twenty on the revised list.32 THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT
been formed by a series of mergers and acquisitions, the proxy
statement records of their officers' pay did not always have enough
consistency or continuity to allow a proper reconstruction of the
relevant experience. Finally, even certain very large firms had been
admitted to trading on an organized securities exchange—thereby
coming under the disclosure regulations of the SEC—too recently
to have generated an adequate public data history.3°
For these reasons, it became necessary to reach down as far as the
corporation which ranked 78th in sales volume in 1963 in order to
round out a list of fifty concerns whose compensation policies could
be traced with the requisite precision. Despite these minor difficulties,
the resulting sample clearly encompasses a sufficiently broad range
of industrial categories—some fifteenin all—andiscomprised
throughout of firms of sufficient size—sales running from $660 mil-
lion to $16.5 billion in 1963—that the findings therefrom can appro-
priately be considered a fair representation of the scale and structure
of managerial rewards in the nation's large, publicly held manu-
facturing enterprises. The complete list of firms involved is recorded
in Appendix B.
The goal established was to collect data on as many executive
positions in the corporate hierarchy as was feasible, and to go as
far back in time as the proxy statement evidence would allow. Oper-
ationally, it turned out that the year 1940 was pretty well the practical
limit of the analysis. The SEC first demanded formal proxy informa-
tion of firms in the late 1930's, but the initial rules for reporting the
compensation figures which are of interest here were not rigorous
enough to bring about uniform and comprehensive disclosure for
several years. With the exceptions noted above, however, it was
possible to assemble a good history for most large companies from
30TheSEC rules were tightened in the mid-1960's to require proxy state-
ment compensation reports of many unlisted companies aswell, but this
change came too late to be of any help in connection with data for earlier
periods. Perhaps the most prominent case of a large firm for which such
information is unavailable is Ford Motor Company, whose shares were not
listed on an exchange until 1956. A comparable problem still exists for Western
Electric Company, which is one of the country's largest manufacturers but is a
wholly owned subsidiary of AT&T and therefore not required to report
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1940 on, The analysis ends with 1963 simply because that year was
the latest for which data were available at the time the original study
was begun.3'
The number of individuals whose earnings and stockholdings are
tabulated in the typical proxy statement varies widely from company
to company—and, for that matter, very often from year to year
within a given company. After a few trial runs, it became evident that
in considering the entire group of firms, an evaluation of the remun-
eration and the ownership income associated with the five highest-
paid executive positions in each would be the maximum coverage
thatthedata would support with any reasonable consistency.
A history of those five positions will therefore be the focus of the
discussion. The sample that emerges includes 552differentindividuals
in the 50 corporations. Of the 6000 man-years of compensation and
investment experience which would comprise a complete data matrix
—i.e., five positions in 50companiesover 24 years—a total of
roughly 5200 were filled in. A record of the resulting population,
broken down by year and by executive rank, is presented in Ap-
pendix C.82
The Retail Trade Sample
As a counterpoint to that sample, information on a separate group
of corporations engaged primarily in retail trade was compiled. While
any one of a number of broad categories of firms could have provided
a potentially interesting and useful contrast to the findings for the
large industrials, retailers were chosen because they offered what
seemed a sensible combination of characteristics for purposes of the
study. The nature of their business activities differs markedly from
that of manufacturers, thus allowing the structure of rewards in a
The cooperation of the staff of the Baker Library at the Harvard Business
School in securing access to the extensive collection of corporation records
which that library maintainsisgratefully acknowledged. Those documents
provided the raw materials for both this investigation and its predecessor.
32 This sample is marginally smaller than that which was included in the
initial compensation study,since,as was indicated above, there were six
executives for whom earnings data could be obtained but not stock ownership
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substantially different organizational context to be examined. Con-
venient, up-to-date rankings of retailing enterprises by annual sales
volume are furnished by Fortune magazine in the same way that the
500 largest industrials are tabulated each year. Since the common
shares of sizeable retailers have been listed and traded on
securities exchanges for quite some time, good historical proxy state-
ment dataavailable. Finally, the various elements of the executive
compensation package have been developed by retail firms over the
years to a degree, that produces in the relevant earnings figures a rich
background for an investigation of management's ownership income.
If these attributes do not render retailers the only appropriate com-
plementary sample choice, they do at least suggest a manifest suit-
ability for the role.
The processofselectingparticular companies paralleledthat
adopted in connection with the large manufacturing sample. Begin-
ning at the top of the Fortune "Merchandising" rankings for 1963
and workin.g downward,33 the back proxy statement files of each
successive firm were reviewed, and every corporation for which ade-
q:uate historical information on executive remuneration and stock-
holdings could be assembed was included. In the interest of construct-
ing as coherent a sample as possible, grocery chains were separated
from the department-and-discount-store group, only the latter being
considered. Logically, the decision could have gone either way, but
the food retailers appeared to embody certain of the desirable char-
acteristics noted above to a somewhat smaller extent than did their
nonfood brethren. Consequently, they seemed a marginally less
attractive choice. The 1963 Fortune list was employed simply to
ensure maximum comparability of the findings with the original large
manufacturing output. By the same reasoning, information was col-
lected again for the period 1940 through 1963.
in all, a proper chronological analysis was feasible for the experi-
ence of the men who filled the top five executive positions at fifteen
major retailers over the indicated period. The group encompasses
fifteen of the first twenty-three on the Fortune roster—grocers and
"The Fortune Directory: Part II," Fortune, Vol. LXX, No. 2 (August
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wholesalers excluded—and it covers almost every important nation-
wide or regional chain of department stores currently doing business.
By way of comparison with the industrial sample, the companies at
issue accounted in 1963 for $15.8 billion of the $246.4 billion aggre-
gate United States retail sales.34 Information on 192 different execu-
tives was gathered, and a resulting total of 1757 man-years of com-
pensation history are Thus, in most dimensions, the sample
is roughly one-fourth to one-third the size and relative importance of
its large manufacturing counterpart. The specific firms included are
listed in Appendix B, and the sample size each year by position can
be found in Appendix C.
The Small Manufacturing Sample
The third group of enterprises studied consists of a collection of
small manufacturers, the objective in their selection being an attempt
to determine the degree to which the patterns of compensation and
ownership income observed in large industrial corporations hold
more generally for the manufacturing sector. Whether by some
absolute standard the firms which ended up in the sample can fairly
be termed "small" is perhaps a legitimate question, since the smallest
among them had sales of $87 million, and the largest $139 million,
in 1963. It is clear, however, that they operate in a much different
market context and at a much more modest scale of activity than do
the corresponding fifty large manufacturers. The difficulty with seek-
ing a sample of still smaller companies is simply one of obtaining
data. Complete past proxy statement records become considerably
harder to put together—as well as significantly less informative in
many instances—at the under-$100 million sales level. This occurs
not only because of the later stock exchange listing of the majority of
such firms, but also because their business and management history
seems often to involve rather more in the way of periodic upheavals
than the larger companies display. A corporation with $100 million
Survey of Current Business, op. cit., p. S-4.
Out ofthe 1800—five positions in15 companies for 24 years—which
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sales in 1963 may, of course, have been a very small enterprise back
in 1940, when the data we are interested in begin.36
The initial try at constructing the sample focused on the firms
ranked 450th and below on the Fortune 1963 list, but of the resulting
fifty-one possibilities, only four turned out in their proxy statements
to provide enough consistent information on managerial earnings
and stockholdings to permit the necessary analysis for their five
highest-paid executive positions. The 400-to-449th category sub-
sequently yielded another four, and it was not until the examination
was extended to the companies ranked 350-to-399th that a group
totaling fifteen, to at least match in size the retail trade sample, could
be assembled.37 Since the corporations included therein represent
quite a broad range of industries, the decision was to stop at that
point and to assume that the 196 executives and the 1,781 man-years
of experience which emerged could be regarded as an adequate basis
for drawing useful conclusions about the circumstances of the senior
officers of smaller firms. Appendix B lists the relevant companies, and
Appendix C tabulates, as before, the yearly sample size in each of the
five positions.
Summary
An investigation of the ownership income enjoyed by professional
managers seems an important undertaking because of its potential
implications for both economic theory and economic practice. Not
only do a great many of our normative models depend for their
validity on the notion that the affairs of corporations are adminis-
tered with the goal of profit maximization paramount in manage-
ment's mind, but so do many of our consequent claims about the
viability and vigor of the actual economy. The intention here is that
the dimensions of the relationship between corporate performance
and executive incomes be revealed in order that judgments about the
possible effects of the prevailing separation of ownership and manage-
Several of the firms eventually chosen, for example, had annual sales in
the $6—$7 million range in the early 1940's.
Thelargest firm was ranked 353rd in sales in 1963, and the smallest 495th.THE METHODOLOGY AND THE DATA 37
ment may be arrived at in a more informed manner. The conceptual
framework developed, and the attendant computational techniques,
have been designed to cast up evidence that will foster such an under-
standing. They will be applied historically to three different samples,
comprising a total of 80 companies, 940 executives, and approxi-
mately 8,750 man-years of income experience.